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a b s t r a c t
Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on
security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible —
greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Since Becker (1968)’s pioneering work on crime and punish-
ment, economists have recognized that criminals are rational eco-
nomic agents responsive to costs and benefits.While Becker’swork
has spawned a rich literature on the economics of crime, our par-
ticular focus in this paper is on private precautions against crime
and their interaction with government expenditure on security.
Becker implicitly assumes that private and public preventive
measures are substitutes: if the state spends substantially on crime
prevention, individuals need to spend less to achieve a given rate of
arrest. Thismay pose a public choice dilemma along the lines of the
Peltzman Effect. Peltzman (1975) argued that safety regulations
induce moral hazard, causing reckless individual behavior that
may ultimately offset the direct effect of the safety regulations.
Similarly, Hylton (1996) mentions that individuals under-invest
in private precautions simply from a tendency to over-rely
on government enforcement. Does government expenditure on
crime-prevention then necessarily give rise to moral hazard,
discouraging costly private precautions? This is the question we
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +65 68280289; fax: +65 68280833.
E-mail address: bguha@smu.edu.sg (B. Guha).
investigate. Private precautions against crime are embedded in day
to day life; therefore the question of whether such precautions
would be necessarily discouraged by increased public expenditure
on security is an important and relevant one.
We allow for two types of private precautions. First, individuals
may spend directly on security equipment that increases the
probability of foiling a criminal attack (for example, on guns
or burglar alarms). Secondly, they — even if risk-neutral — can
‘‘insure’’ themselves against attacks through strategies of costly
diversification. These reduce the prize a criminal can seize in
a single attempt. We model three cases, one in which both
types of precautions can be taken, a second in which only direct
security expenses can be incurred (assets being indivisible, ruling
out diversification) and a third in which individuals may take
precautions through diversification, but cannot take any steps
to directly foil crimes, perhaps due to legal restrictions (e.g. on
private firearms, or noise regulations banning burglar alarms). In
all threemodels, greater policing does not necessarily inducemoral
hazard. Indeed, there are always conditions where greater policing
encourages private precautions, while low policing discourages
them. Interestingly, while in the model with indivisible assets,
this result obtains when policing enhances the effectiveness of
direct private security equipment, in the more general model
where both diversification and direct security expenses are
permitted, the result obtains when government policing and
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private security spending are strongly substitutable, rather than
complementary. Thus, it is not the case that policing encourages
private precautions for only a unique technology; different
technologies are compatible with a positive relationship between
precautions and policing.
Related literature on private precautions includes, besides the
papers already mentioned, Shavell (1991), Ehrlich (1981), Lacroix
and Marceau (1995), Friedman et al. (1987), Ben-Shahar and Harel
(1995) and Clements (2003).1 Shavell (1991), Ben-Shahar and
Harel (1995) and Clements (2003) are not concerned with the
interaction of private and government security measures, but only
with reasons why the equilibrium level of private precautions
differs from the socially optimal one. Similarly, Leeson (2007)
considers a model with private precautions against crime,2 but
in a stateless society without government security. Ehrlich (1981)
assumes that the government’s only role is to set fines for
criminals, and that therefore the government’s actions do not
affect private individuals’ demands for precautions in the ‘‘market
for offenses’’. Friedman et al. assume that ‘‘private security’’
is a collectively consumed good and also explicitly postulate
that private and public security are substitutes and additively
separable. Lacroix and Marceau (1995) model private precautions
in a setting of incomplete information.3 While their focus is
not on the interaction between private and government security
measures, they find a ‘‘moral hazard’’ type effect in that if public
spending is high, people are less likely to take precautions. Thus,
these papers differ from ours in focus, assumptions and results.
Unlike us, none of the above authors explicitly model costly
diversification.
In addition to the papers above, our paper is also connected
to the wider economics literature on crime.4 Most of this
literature studies the causes or effects of organized crime or
optimal prevention methods. Some literature has also empirically
investigated the effects of greater policing on crime rates; an
important example is Levitt (1997); a more recent one is Lin
(2009). Many other empirical studies on the subject are surveyed
in Cameron (1988).
2. Amodel of private precautions and government expenditure
on policing
2.1. Framework
A criminal attempts to acquire loot of value L. Criminals seize
any opportunity for crime that promises an expected income
exceeding their outside option (which we normalize to zero). All
agents are risk-neutral and have complete information. During
an attack, a criminal faces a probability p of being caught, where
p is an increasing function of government expenditure on crime
prevention, G, as well as of private expenditure on security, x:
p = p(G, x) (1)
such that pG > 0, pGG < 0, px > 0, pxx < 0. The sign of pxG
is not obvious and depends on the specific nature of the security
equipment. pxG > 0 if x and G are complementary (e.g. private
1 See Garoupa (2002) for a comprehensive survey of post-Beckerian literature on
the economics of crime.
2 Taken by farmers expecting bandit attacks.
3 This is in contrast to our paper, which assumes common knowledge of all
parameters and variables.
4 Including Stigler (1970), Schelling (1971), Anderson (1979), Reuter (1983,
1987), Jennings (1984), Arlacchi (1986), Jankowski (1991), Dick (1995), Konrad and
Skaperdas (1998), Garoupa (2000), Skaperdas (2001), Chang et al. (2005) andMiceli
(2010).
spending on burglar alarms and government spending on rapid
police response); pxG < 0 if they are substitutable (e.g. private
expenditure on guns may be more effective in deterring crime
when the police are ill-armed).
Let S be the penalty or ‘‘sentence’’ that a criminal receives if
caught. He then expects to gain loot L with probability 1 − p, and
to be subjected to S with probability p. He knows the values of x
and G — and therefore of p; he also knows L and S. He attacks iff
(1− p)L− pS > 0
or L > pS/(1− p) = L. (2)
The prizemust be large enough to risk capture and punishment for
it. L is increasing in p,
dL/dp = S/(1− p)2 > 0, (3)
and therefore also in x and G.
Besides direct expenses on security x, an individual can take
costly private precautions of a different nature; these involve
‘‘diversification’’ or ‘‘not putting all one’s eggs in one basket’’. These
measures reduce cash or assets ‘‘on hand’’ so that a criminal can
only seize a limited amount at one attempt. They include hiding
one’s cash and valuables in many different places (in different
homes, if one hasmore than one, in different banks, going out with
only little cash to discouragemugging, maintainingmany different
credit cards, each with small balances, etc.). In particular, if an
individual can divide his assets into enough lots to make each too
small for a criminal to risk capture for, he could insure himself
against crime. However, such ameasure is costly: the person incurs
a fixed transaction cost A of operating each lot. In terms of our
model, diversification entails reducing each lot to a maximum of L.
The threshold L — and hence the number of required lots — varies
with p, and therefore with x and G. Higher x and G reduce the cost
of diversification: a given wealth L need now be divided into fewer
lots to deter crime.
We consider three cases below. In the first an individual has
divisible assets he may diversify and/or spend on direct security
measures (x). In the second, his assets are indivisible (e.g. an
Old Master) and diversification is impossible, though he may
incur x on direct security. Third, his assets may be divisible and
permit diversification, but private security expenditure may be
banned (e.g. bans on private gun ownership or noise regulations
prohibiting burglar alarms). For each case, we show that a high
level of policing can encourage private precautions.
2.2. Divisible assets, direct private security expenses permitted
In this environment, an individual who owns assets of value L
can insure himself against crimes by dividing his wealth into n lots,
each of size L/n, where n is an integer, and (through his choice of
x) adjusting p to pn such that
L(pn) = L/n. (4)
Given G, a high enough choice of x increases p to the point pn such
that the size of each lot is too small to tempt criminals to risk
capture and punishment. Through these measures, an individual
can deter all attacks. From (2) and (4), (1− pn)L/n = pnS
or pn = L/(L+ nS). (5)
Now consider any integerm. As the number of lots increases from
m tom+ 1, the level of p required to deter criminals falls from pm
to pm+1 with
pm − pm+1 = LS/{(L+mS)(L+ (m+ 1)S)} (6)
from (5). Clearly this difference is decreasing inm. Therefore,
pm − pm+1 > pm+1 − pm+2. (7)
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The fall in p from pm to pm+1 reflects a fall in x (given G) from xm to
xm+1. Now rewrite (1) as
x = x(G, p) (8)
where xG = ∂x/∂G (with p constant) < 0, xp = ∂x/∂p (with G
constant)= 1/px > 0, xpp = −pxx/p2x > 0. The concavity of p(G, x)
in x implies the convexity of x(G, p) in p. Now we state our first
result.
Proposition 1. If direct private expenditure on security is permitted,
and assets are divisible, an individual’s likelihood of insuring himself
completely against crime increases with government expenditure
against crime G if pxG is strongly negative, specifically, iff pxxpG −
pxGpx > 0.
Proof. This proof proceeds in two steps, first deriving the neces-
sary and sufficient condition for diversification, then assessing the
effect of G on this condition.
Step 1. Let p assume successively the values pm, (pm + pm+2)/2,
pm+2. From the convexity of x in p, we then have
x(G, pm)/2+ x(G, pm+2)/2 > x(G, (pm + pm+2)/2) or
x(G, pm)− x(G, (pm + pm+2)/2) > x(G, (pm + pm+2)/2)
− x(G, pm+2). (9)
From (7), we have
(pm + pm+2)/2 > pm+1. (7′)
As x is increasing in p, it follows from (7′) that
x(G, (pm + pm+2)/2) > x(G, pm+1). (10)
Using (9) and (10), we then obtain a series of inequalities:
x(G, pm) − x(G, pm+1) > x(G, pm) − x(G, (pm + pm+2)/2) >
x(G, (pm+pm+2)/2)−x(G, pm+2) > x(G, pm+1)−x(G, pm+2). Con-
secutive increments in m reflect consecutively smaller reductions
in x. However, each increase in m implies a constant increase in
transaction cost A (the cost of operating one extra lot). Then, iff
x(G, p1) − x(G, p2) > A, so that division into at least two lots is
worthwhile, there exists somem such that x(G, pm−1)−x(G, pm) >
A and x(G, pm)−x(G, pm+1) < A.m > 1 is thus the optimal number
of lots. The necessary and sufficient condition for diversification is,
therefore,
x(G, p1)− x(G, p2) > A (11)
or x(G, L/(L+ S))− x(G, L/(L+ 2S)) > A. (11′)
Intuitively, diversifying intomore than one lot entails a transaction
cost of A. However, it also implies lower x than without
diversification; if lots are not too large, p — and so x — need
not be very high to discourage criminals. Under (11′), the
reduction in direct security expenditure outweighs the increase in
diversification costs, and diversification becomes economical.
Step 2. Now consider the effect of G on condition (11). It is easy to
see that a high level of G, while leaving the RHS of (11) unchanged,
increases its LHS, thus making diversification more likely, iff xpG >
0. Nownote that xpG = ∂xp/∂Gwith p constant. Constant p implies,
from (1),
pG.dG+ pxdx = 0
or dG/dx = −px/pG. (12)
Now xpG = ∂xp/∂G = ∂[1/px]/∂G
= −[pxG + pxxdx/dG]/p2x . (13)
From (12) and (13), xpG = −[pxG − pxxpG/px]/p2x
or sgn (xpG) = sgn [pxxpG − pxGpx]. (14)
Thus the condition xpG > 0 is equivalent to the condition
pxxpG − pxGpx > 0. (15)
Since pxx < 0, px > 0, pG > 0, a necessary condition for (15)
is pxG < 0. Therefore, higher policing increases the likelihood
of private precautions through costly diversification if policing
reduces the marginal efficacy of direct private security measures
by a sufficient amount. 
The intuition is as follows. The benefit of not diversifying is the
saving in transaction cost A, its cost is the higher expenditure on
raising p enough to discourage criminals. Specifically, one spends
x(G, p1) > x(G, p2) (which is what one spends if diversifying into
2 lots). If more policing reduces themarginal efficacy of x in raising
p, this implies that x must be raised by a large amount to raise p
from p2 to p1. If, therefore, pxG is sufficiently negative, the cost of
not diversifying exceeds its benefit, and the individual diversifies.
Further, an increase in policing also entails an opposite effect.
When policing increases, less x is needed to achieve the same
p. Lower x implies a higher marginal efficacy of x in raising p
(higher px), given pxx < 0, thereby reducing the increase in x
required to achieve a given rise in p. Hence this effect lowers the
cost of not diversifying, opposing the previous effect. The first
effect dominates when (15) holds, that is, when pxG is sufficiently
strongly negative.
2.3. Divisible assets, direct private security expenses not permitted
Now consider an environment where the individual cannot
directly influence p via x (due, say, to bans on private gun
ownership, noise regulations prohibiting burglar alarms, etc.) so
that p = p(G). For a given G, therefore, the ‘‘safe’’ threshold
L is uniquely determined by (2). Individuals whose wealth is
less are safe from criminal attacks, and need no precautions. An
individual with L > L may still take private precautions through
diversification. He can divide his wealth L into n+ 1 lots, n of size
L, and one of size B = L − nL < L. Those who do not take these
measures avoid the fixed costs (A per lot) of the n extra lots, but
risk losing all their wealth to a successful criminal attack (which
happens with probability 1− p). Individuals split their wealth into
lots iff their extra transaction costs, nA, fall short of their expected
loss from criminal attack, (1− p)L, i.e., if
nA < (1− p)L. (16)
Proposition 2. If assets are divisible, but individuals cannot directly
affect p, then individuals with wealth L > L always self-insure
through costly diversification if policing is high enough such that
p(G) > A/S, or, equivalently, G > p−1[A/S]. Such individuals never
self-insure in the above sense if p < nA/(n+ 1)S, or, equivalently, if
G < p−1[nA/(n+ 1)S].
Proof. Step 1. If p > A/S, npS > nA, or, from (2),
n(1− p)L > nA. (17)
Now, by definition, L > nL. Therefore (17) implies (16): (1− p)L >
nA. Hence, wealthy individuals self-insure through diversification
if policing — or penalties, S — are high enough. Far from causing
moral hazard, increasing government effort encourages such costly
self-insurance.
Step 2. p < nA/(n+ 1)S implies (n+ 1)pS < nA, which, using (2),
is equivalent to
(n+ 1)(1− p)L < nA. (18)
Now L < (n+ 1)L by definition. Therefore (18) implies
(1− p)L < nA
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which from (16) implies that individuals never self-insure.
Therefore, low rather than high state investment on security and
policing induces a neglect of costly self-insurance. 
Intuitively, the reason for Proposition 2 is that a rise in G and
hence in p pushes up the threshold L below which criminals do
not find crime worthwhile. By doing so, it reduces the transaction
costs, or diseconomies of scale, associated with this form of
diversification; fewer lots are now required to keep one’s wealth
safe from criminals. Conversely, low policing implies that it is also
very expensive to split one’s property into enough ‘‘lots’’ to be safe
from criminals because the threshold for safety is very small.
2.4. Indivisible assets, direct private security expenses permitted
If the individual’s assets are indivisible, the costly diversifica-
tion described above is not feasible. However, he is free to incur x,
thereby raising p. Such an individual has two options:
(a) He could choose x to minimize expected losses — his expenses
on security x plus expected loss from a successful crime
(in which event he loses L with probability 1 − p).The
individual’s optimization exercise is
Min
x
{(1− p(x))L+ x}.
This yields the first order condition
px(G, x) = 1/L (19)
which is sufficient for minimization since pxx < 0. Thus x is the
optimal x.
(b) Alternatively, he could raise x to the level where p rises enough
so that — even without diversification — he raises L all the
way to L, deterring a criminal attack. The target p is given by
(1 − p)L = pS or p = L/(L + S). The x required to reach this
target p is given by
p(G, x˜) = L/(L+ S), (20)
which may be rewritten as
x˜ = x˜(G, L, S), (21)
where x˜ is increasing in L and decreasing in G and S.
The individual chooses between options (a) and (b)
depending on which option entails lower expected costs. Thus
he chooses option (a) iff
(1− p(x))L+ x ≤ x˜(G, L, S), (22)
i.e. if, for given G and L, S ≤ S∗, where (22) holds as an equation
for S = S∗.
Proposition 3. If assets are indivisible, but private expenditure
on security is permitted, then greater policing increases private
precautions iff (i) pxG > 0, and (ii) penalties for captured criminals,
S, are not too heavy.
Proof. Option (a) is chosen if S ≤ S∗, so condition (19) holds.
Totally differentiating (19),
dx/dG = −pxG/pxx. (23)
Since pxx < 0, dx/dG has the same sign as pxG. Hence, if pxG > 0,
that is, if government spending enhances the efficacy of private
spending on security (as can happen with rapid police response
and burglar alarms), private precautions increase optimally with
G. 
Intuitively, without extremely heavy penalties, the owner of
a valuable but indivisible asset is unlikely to be able to deter
criminals unless he incurs uneconomically high expenses on
security. He therefore opts for incomplete deterrence by choosing
a lower x and incurring some risk of theft. However, if government
spending raises the efficacy of private measures in combating
crime, greater policing could encourage private spending on
security.
3. Conclusion
Conventional wisdom focuses on the direct effect of greater
policing in reducing the probability of a successful crime. It
suggests that greater policing causes moral hazard, inducing
neglect of costly private precautions. This is in line with
the Peltzman effect as well as with Becker’s assumption of
substitutability between private and public expenditure on
security. We have examined three models; in one, people can
undertake costly diversification, as well as additional expenditure
that directly reduces the probability of a successful attack. In each
of the other models, one of these options is withdrawn; the asset
may be indivisible and diversification impossible; alternatively,
it may be possible to diversify but not to directly reduce the
probability of a criminal’s success. In all three models, we derive
conditions to show that greater policing need not cause negligence.
More policing can, on the contrary, encourage private precautions.
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